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Contesting Exclusion: Uneven Development and the Genesis of the Sudan's Darfur War

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> *The present disastrous situation in Darfur is the outcome of a complex web of underdevelopment, ecological, political, social, and security factors… (Hamad, Z.M. Mohammed [n.d].)*

1. Introduction

The civil war in the Sudan's Darfur region has been on the world's agenda for quite sometime now. But the solutions to the conflict are far from sight due to the multiplicity of actors and multiple competing interests that are involve. Compounding the volatile military-political situation and its accompanied complex emergencies is that the responses of the international community have been vague and not encourage enough. Additionally, Darfur is not assisted by the "rushed and ungrounded suggestions on how to best support on-going work for peace and how to reach long lasting political solutions" (Norberg and Brune, 2007: 5). The Darfurian crisis, opposing the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and its proxy militia force (the *Janjaweed*) on the one hand, and the different regional rebel movements championed by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on another hand[1], has resulted in the stupendous loss of lives and property. Between February 2003 when the war started and 2009, the conflict had produced hundreds of thousands of deaths, more than 2 million displaced (Liegeois, 2009), while mass raping, gangsterism, etc, are now the 'normal' ways of life in this 'highly unfortunate' region.

[1] Presently there are more than 30 rebel movements in Darfur.

Certainly, scholars have provided us with different versions of the conflict's etiology. While a large number of interesting studies blame the conflict on racial factor, i.e. conflict between 'the Arabs' and 'the Black Africans', others see it from the prismatic lenses of ecology, i.e. the competitions for scarce natural productive resources of pasture and water for agricultural and other vital economic purposes as the pivotal factor that trigger the current conflict. Instead, I transcend these dominant views and solicit for alternative explanations for a better understanding of this Darfurian challenge. What is striking is that the crisis can be analysed at three levels, viz, (1) conflict between GoS and the Darfur region over the sharing of national wealth and power; (2) conflict occasioned by tribal rivalries championed by tribal elite; and, finally (3) conflict between the identity groups, i.e. between the African farmers and Arab pastoralists. Unquestionably, these three types of conflicts have the same root: the issue marginalisation (both historical and contemporary) or what Mohamed (2007) refers to as 'relative underdevelopment' that has badly affected every facet of Darfur's life; which in turn can be traced to governance crisis occasioned by the lopsided policies of Khartoum and its riverine-dominated Arab elite; thereby reinforcing Hamad's argument as stated in the epigraphy above. Understandably, the 'unjust' policies of Khartoum are unsurprising since these were inherited from the British colonial administration that placed the Arabs above African ethnic groups. From the preceding, this article probes the underlying causes of the conflict using a diachronic approach and explains how the issue of marginalisation of the region triggers the types of conflicts identified above, and, finally proffers some useful policy suggestions that might assist in halting the festering conflict trajectory, and ameliorating the current tragic situations in Darfur in particular and the Sudan in general. The theoretical frameworks favoured by this study are, therefore, Frustration-Aggression theory and neopatrimonialism in order to have a proper understanding of the crisis.

2. Theorectical Framework of Analysis

My objective here is to discuss the interface between the issue of marginalisation and Darfur conflict within the broad contexts of conceptual and theoretical postulations. The focus is, therefore, to probe how the perpetual impoverishment of ethnic groups by a neopatrimonial state, with all its fissiparous traits, triggers responses/reactions that can be at the perils of such state. I seek to situate this discourse within the framework of the Frustration—Aggression theory as advanced by Dollard, et al (1939). Its basic argument, rigorously elaborated by Davies (1962: 5-19), is that relative deprivation occurs when expected need satisfaction increases linearly overtime, whereas the actual need satisfaction levels off after sometime. This scenario is, undoubtedly, bound to be resulted into an increasing gap between the expected and the actual, which definitely causes frustration and mobilizes such frustrated people to engage in violence (Ellingsen, 2000: 230). Drawing on a wide range of data war sets, Ted Gurr (1970) argues that the motivation of people to involve in violence is conditioned by the deprivation experience when the expected needs are not in sight; implying that relative deprivation is a necessary precondition for conflict. The insight from this theory can be put thus: the higher the people have perceived deprivation in relations to their expectations, the greater their dissatisfactions, the more tension among members of a society, the likelihood of civil strife is severe. The Frustration-Aggression theoreticians argued that the theory is based on three fundamental assumptions: First, that aggression is a function of frustration and frustration mostly results in aggression. Second, frustration is an interference with the occurrence of an instigate goal response at its proper time. Third, the theory pattern is culture bound because aggressive impulses and group/individual targets are determined and shaped by different cultural systems. Thus, social system is obliged to finding appropriate mechanism(s) locate and manage sources of frustration and also for aggression.

How, then, can the state be the architect of people's frustration that leads to aggression? This can be explained

within the context of the neopatrimonial character of the African states. Then, how does the theory of neopatrimonialism assist us in explaining the conflict under focus? Neopatrimonialism, a variant of Max Weber's patrimonialism is, according to Médard (1991: 323), a hybrid setting within which patrimonial logic combines with other modern logics. In a neopatrimonial state, there is an intentionally erosion of the dichotomy between the public and private domains in governance and state administration; including, of course, between public and private norms with fatal consequences for the state and its people. The theory unmasks the centrality of political power since access to the state permits its privatisation and patrimonialisation. Thus, African leaders see politics as a means to wealth and consequently the redistribution of the state resources to ethnic and/or tribesmen, political gladiators, etc, become germane to reinforcing their hold on power, thereby enhancing further primitive accumulation. Thus, it is generally undeniably clear that the state executives see and consider these as points for the exaction of prebendes. In a neopatrimonial state, democratic principles in governance are often long-forgotten, while democratic space is constricting daily, not forgetting that financial probity and transparency remain aliens. Both economic and politics fail to operate according to the logic of free choice. The neopatrimonial state is authoritarian and violence-prone. Certainly, the level of patrimonialism in each state is conditioned on the amount of resources available to political leaders for pillage and distribution (Bratton and van den Walle, 1994). In a neopatrimonial state, the economy is in the firm grip of the state executives and since politics seems to be the basis of managing economic activities, it is bound to be inefficient and unaccountable. Economic crisis becomes its indelible mark which, by extension, transformed into political chaos as the state and society are at daggers drawn position for the control of the constricted space

These theoretical conjectures are apt and convincingly beneficial in our search for understanding the Darfur crisis, for the neopatrimonial and rentier characters of the Sudanese state (even in the pre-independence Sudan)

culminated in the unequal distribution of the fruits of growth to the detriment of Darfur, lead to underdevelopment and eventually compelling the marginalised people to violence resisting Khartoum's policies and at another level, inducing conflicts among different ethnic groups competing for the limited 'available underdeveloped' resources. Thus, the failed expectations of Darfurians in a neopatrimonial Sudan resulted in frustration that eventually lead to aggression in term of war.

3. Mapping Darfur: Geographical, Sociological and Historical Contexts

Darfur is a region found in the western part of the Republic of the Sudan (RoS) and lies between latitude 10°—16° N and longitude 22° —27° 30'E. Darfur has an average area of 160,000 square miles, and is topographically diverse with high desert in the north flows into lush grassland in the south. The troubled region, with a population of 7 million, became part of the larger Anglo-Egyptian Sudan with the assassination of its last Fur Sultan, Ali Dinar, by the British forces on 6 November 1916. Geographically, in spite of the signing of the border agreement between London and Paris, in January 1924, the official border delimitations between Darfur and the French Equatorial Africa (i.e. present day Chad and Central African Republic) did not materialise until 1938. Consequently, a significant number of ethnic groups along the border area were divided into two by international borders with consequences that are central to the relationships among the post-colonial states.

To really understand what is actually unfolding in Darfur, we need to step back into history. Darfur had a long history of being a traditional Sudanese Kingdom with multi-ethnic composition of which the Keira constitute its ethnic core. Originated in the mid-17th century (c. 1650), people began to converge around *Jebel Marra* tableland that heralded the emergence of a state-like structure of a centralised polity. Also established more than a century earlier (precisely in 1504) was the Funj Kingdom that occupied the Nile valley area. In spite of the fact that both Kingdoms espoused Islamic ideology, they were not only

autonomous, but also antagonistic to each another. This situation led to numerous military activities and the quest for invasion by one against the other with negative consequences of vitiating the usefulness of extending the nationalist interpretation of those antecedents of the RoS. Both Kingdoms espoused the ideology of an Islamicised state while the ruling families of both Kingdoms laid claim to Arab ancestry. The implication of this claim is that it placed the royal families outside, as well as over and above the multiple indigenous tribal/ethnic groups over whom they reigned. For, the claim of Arabic descent made the royal families close to Muhammed, the Prophet of Islam. The Funj and Fur royalties claimed Ummayyad Arab and Hilali Arab roots respectively.

The claim of Arab ancestry of the ruling families appears to be unfounded going by their physical appearances since they are all dark-skinned Sudanese. Thus, affinal ties constituted a vital force that integrated different ethnic groups and helped tremendously in expanding the frontier of the Fur Sultanate from the *Jebel Marra* massive. This is because the Fur Sultans married their daughters to various ethnic/tribal chiefs; making princesses to cross ethnic frontiers in marriages, thus cemented relations with the rulers and predatory-expansion by military forces. These affinal ties placed the Fur Sultans in a very high position, and empowered them to incorporate other ethnic formations into their fold as tributaries. It should be recalled that the first Fur Sultan, Sulayman Solong, was a product of affinal tie of an Arab father and a Fur princess. Overall, during the initial phase, Fur Sultanate was 'relatively' peaceful.

The fairly stable atmosphere served as a launching pad for the Sultanate's incorporation of smaller and sedentary tribal groups into its fold[1]; and by extension the Sultan was responsible for guaranteeing the state security. It appears that the kind of social contract between the leaders and the followers in the Fur Sultanate at the epoch was not

[1] The sedentary groups were the Berti, Daju, Dadinga, Tunjur, Mima, Marareet, and the migrant religious men from West Africa

total because the level of submission to the Sultans was seemingly varied. This is because the nomadic groups were less controlled by the state; a situation that saw frequently armed contests between the state and these groups in the former's quest to subjugate the latter. Furthermore, the picture painted above does not suggest that affinal ties were not extended to the leaders of nomadic groups where sometime they were also wheedled to act as tributaries for the Sultans.

The Fur Sultanate political system can be described as consociational (read: Lijphart, 1977) because at the apex of the power pyramid was the Sultan who imposed laws that were expected to be obeyed throughout his jurisdiction. Though, these orders were imposed in collaboration with the leaders of the constituent ethnic groups who acted as their tributaries. Additionally, the Sultans were duty bound to act as arbiters in any dispute that might ensue and also allocated land rights to different and numerous territorialised ethnic groups through their elite that were equally lured into affinal ties through intermarriages. Thus, the "nature of legitimacy which informed the position of the royal elite had a religion and divine character…" Since the Sultanate was dichotomised along the lines of ethnicity, tribe, language, etc, religion served as a web that unified it, while the Sultans were recognised as Divine rulers. Therefore, the society was maintained by a kingship obligation as well as the acceptance of Allah's will.

Thus, the region's territorialised ethnic structure is central to fathom the inter-ethnic/intra-tribal relations and competitions in contemporary Darfur. This is because its spatial distribution was characterised by segmental cleavages[1] of tribes, linguistics etc, in which most of the groups have a traditional *dar* (i.e. homeland) that bears their names, determine their production systems, and which in spite of the regular contacts with other tribal/ethnic groups, socially reproduce themselves autonomous of others. In this context, the ethnic Fur occupies the central Darfur with other small groups that engage in farming. To the south of the Fur, we have the Baggara Arabs and other groups that are cattle breeders, while the nomadic camel breeding Arab

[1] On the concept of Segmental Cleavages, see Eckstein, 1966.

groups occupy north Darfur. These production systems are not watertight since they are not restricted and in most cases are typified as agro-pastoral. The presence of homeland as a separate territorial entity with its own language, independent political system, etc did absolutely nothing to prevent constant interactions among these groups. Since the search for pasture and water sources induced considerable movements that encourage intra-tribal contacts that always resulted into conflictual relations as competition over these resources became intense. The search for scare resources still have much impacts on the sociological configurations and the relations among ethnic and tribal groups as it flare up multiple and destructive ethnic/tribal conflicts as the Arab/Fur conflicts of the mid-1980s remind us.

4. Marginalisation of Darfur: The Genesis

The incorporation of Darfur into the emerging Sudanese state is pivotal to our understanding of the region's marginalisation history and all its consequences. The formative periods of incorporation are: The Turco-Egyptian rule (1821-1885); the Mahdist State (1885-1898); and the Anglo-Egyptian Colonial/Condominium period (1898-1956) of which the first period terminated the indigenous state formation.

4.1 The Turco-Egyptian Rule (1821-1885)

The Fur Sultanate was eclipsed by the Turco-Egyptian colonial rule in 1873. The Funj Kingdom was earlier conquered by the same power in 1821. Thus, these incidents brought the two kingdoms under foreign occupation and altered the existing consociational political systems, while the boundaries between the two Kingdoms collapsed. Under this rule, the use of force became its hallmarks, while the indigenous people were subjected to exploitation, and any challenge to the established 'exploitative' order was ruthlessly dealt with. Also most parts of southern Sudan were incorporated into the evolving Sudanese state

headquartered in Khartoum. Harir (1994: 30) aptly captures the impacts of the unfolding scenario on Darfur and post-independence Sudan, thus: "The movement of power seat to Khartoum from Darfur and Sennar in the peripheries had major consequences for the political development of the Sudan as this meant *the strengthening of the position of central riverine Sudan at the expense of the peripheries*. Likewise, is the inclusion of the southern parts of the country which became a reserve for slave raids." (Italics added) While the two Kingdoms lost their autonomies, the northern Sudanese ethnic groups (especially those from the Nile valley area—Jaaliyyin, Shaiqiyya, and Nubians) were favoured by the colonial authorities in gaining entry into the state's institutions at the perils of other ethnic formations.

4.2 The Mahdist State/Mahdiya (1885-1898)

The Turco-Egyptian rule reached its crescendo and later descended into ignominy with its defeat by the Mahdist Army in 1885. The Mahdist state (or the Mahdiya) was founded by Mohammed Ahmed Ibn Abdallah—known as the "Mahdi" meaning the "guided one" sent by God to redeem and unite the devout Muslims and purify Islam[1]. The Mahdi led the indigenous revolt with massive supports of the western Sudanese tribal groups against the oppressive foreign rule. The imperative of this period in the evolving Sudanese state "lies, perhaps, not in his call for an Islamic state but rather in the ability of the charismatic leader to exploit the conditions of discontent precipitated by the colonial Turco-Egyptian rule and unify the peripheral Sudanese to conquer the seat of central politics power in Khartoum" (Harir, 1994: 31). Central to the revolution was the imposition of Islamic theocracy in the Sudan propelled by the concept of Jihad and the purification of Islam. Despite the place of Islam in the Mahdist state, the revolution was well supported by Muslims and people of non-Islamic faiths for varied reasons. No sooner had the colonial rule terminated and the death of the Sudan's British Governor, General Gordon, in the Battle of Khartoum in 1885 than the Great Mahdi himself died, while the state's leadership fell on

[1] See Deng, 1994; Woodward, 1979; Holt, 1970; and Theobald, 1965 for detailed historical account of the Great Mahdi, a *Dongolawi* by tribe.

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Khalifa (meaning: Successor) Abdullahi Ibn Mohammed—a Taaisha Baggara Arab from western Sudan.

Not too long afterwards, conflict based on ethnicity ensued between the new leader Abdullahi and Khalifa Sharif who was the cousin of the Mahdi. For, Abdullahi's background, though Arab, was considered as a stranger to their counterpart of the riverine extraction as against the Khalifa Sharif's group that was regarded as the *Awlad al Balad* (Arabic, "sons of the soil")[1]. With the assistance of his Baggara Arab fellows, Abdullahi was able to crush Sharif's rebellion, thereby, became the state's absolute ruler. He, therefore, followed the path of authoritarianism, as personal rule became the norm, while the Baggara tribal hegemony flourished. Abdullahi encouraged the massive migration of his tribesmen to the Mahdist capital, Omdurman, while those that opposed the idea were coerced to do so. Thus, it is argued that "in as much as the massive movement of ethnic groups from the peripheries because of political mobilisation by the centre of Mahdist power was the modality, the Sudanese state at this stage was not only strongly centralised in terms of state ideology, but it is also showed clear tendencies of creating an ethnic core as a vehicle for state formation." Abdullahi later, he "instituted regular administration, appointing Ansars (who were usually Baggara tribes) as Emirs over each of several provinces, but his authority in the Mahdiya remained absolute" (Deng,

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[1]Again Harir's (1994: 31) captivating analysis of this hot issue worth citing *in extensio*. He argues that:

> *Awlad al Balad* is an Arabic term which means the legitimate sons of the land. It has been used historically to refer to Sudanese of Arabic stock from the Nile valley. It prevails even today except for the fact that another term has been added to it so that it can assume more precision of connotation: *Wad Arab* or *Awlad Arab*, the sons of Arabs. In the Mahdist context, although the Khalifa was the leader of the Mahdist state as the legitimate successor to the Mahdi, his *Taaisha* background puts him beyond the connotative boundaries of *Awlad al Balad*. Khalifa Sharif who was the cousin of the late Mahdi was a riverine Mahdist, and by definition *Wad Balad*. Thus, this term, in some sense, demarcates ethnic boundaries between the riverine Sudanese and the rest... The assumed superiority of the *Awlad al Balad*, i.e. riverine Sudanese, is taken as a matter of course. See also Kalid, 1990.

1994: 161). What is fundamental here is that the conflict between the two leaders was rooted in the claim of who was entitled to rule. As *Awlad al Balad,* the riverine Arabs considered as their birthright to decide for the state, while the people from the peripheries, including Darfur, were regarded as followers. This aspect of politics is not yet resolved in contemporary Sudan.

Thus, this internal political wrangling, personality clash between the two Khalifas, famines occasioned by the exodus of the western Baggara tribesmen to Omdurman as Mahdist soldiers, and the expansionist/over ambition of the Mahdiya in exporting Islamic theocracy to the outside world served as its Achilles heel. With the death of Abdullahi during the battle of Um Diwaykarat in Kordofan, the Mahdist state was defeated and the Sudan was 're-conquered' by the Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1898.

4. 3 The Anglo-Egyptian Colonial (Condominium) Rule (1898-1956)

With the fall of the Mahdist state, the Sudan was placed under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule.[1] The state was later embroiled in strong resistance to foreign occupation for more than three decades. Darfur Sultanate that was restored following the defeat of the Mahdist forces by Ali Dinar was forcefully conquered in 1916 and incorporated into the emerging Sudanese state on 1 January 1917. The Condominium rule became the foundation of modern Sudan with all the attributes of a modern statehood. Thus, the post-Mahdist state, though under foreign occupation, could be considered as a positive development in some aspects, especially with defining the territorial cum political entity named the Sudan.

The country was polarised into North-South dichotomy of Arabs and Africans respectively and was administered as such. The claims of some scholars that belong to the Modernisation School that the British colonial policies in Africa were to modernise the traditional societies appear not

[1] The Condominium was an international agreement between Britain and Egypt for the administration of the Sudan. The Agreement was signed in Egypt on 19 January 1899.

too well reconciled with the reality in the Sudan. Though the British regarded themselves as agent of modernisation, by civilising the Sudan through the complete transformation of its traditional society into a modern one by laying the solid foundation for socio—economic developments, etc. This assertion cannot be admitted wholeheartedly in the Sudan's case, for during this period; the existing segmental cleavages were deepened and reinforced by the lopsided colonial policy of divide and rule, which favoured the North. This is unsurprising because the ideology that shaped British colonial governance was Victorian. In the Victorian worldview, Islam is a civilisation but lower in status to Christianity and Western civilisation. Paganism was presumably lower in status than both. Thus, the British declared the South as *de facto* Protectorate and treated the region that was populated by people of non-Islamic faith as 'unprotected' because they, presumably, had no civilisation in the first place to protect like the Muslims. Consequently, the pagans/animists need to be 'protected and civilised' and were exposed to western education through Christian missionaries that were also preoccupied with the wider task of converting the Pagans to Christianity. Policies that encouraged separate development were promoted. The South was further separated from the rest of the country by the promulgation of the Close District Ordinance in 1922 that outlawed 'foreigners' from other parts of the country from entering the South (Collins, 1962; Nalder, 1935; Beshir, 1967).

In the northern Sudan, the Condominium rule/power was very much preoccupied with, and sincerely devoted resources, and time to its socio-economic developments. This policy was rejected by the southerners. With this goal in mind, the North witnessed a meteoric rise in development projects such as the introduction of western education to create semi-skilled Sudanese of northern extraction to occupy the lower echelon in the colonial administration and to produce local submamurs to replace the Egyptians; the proliferation of such agricultural schemes as the Gezira Cotton Irrigation Scheme and the construction of Sennar Dam. The colonial policy, unsurprisingly, bore fruits with the

emergence of, in less than twenty years, a class of elite of northern origin who were absorbed into the Government Services and were later to dominate the Sudan's socio-economic and political life. The class of elite, known as the *Effendiyah*, dominated Sudan's politics and led the country to a negotiated independence in 1956. Thus, the policy was costly because "by the time the Southern policy was reversed in favour of integration with the northern part in 1947, major structural inequalities were already visible. Not least, among them and with major political consequences for the independent Sudan was the development of two parallel elites in the country: a Christanised missionary educated elite in the South and a formally educated riverine elite in the North. The latter was to inherit the colonial state at independence and the former was to be marginalised from access to the state and was to armed struggle" (Harir, 1994: 33).

It is apparent that the colonial state was tyrannical, maintained its authority by force and favoured the North. This scenario would make one to, *prima facie,* contemplate that the Arabs were better off compared to their southern counterparts. Superficially, this may be true but we need to look beyond what was unfolding at that time along the Arab-occupied North and the South regions fault-line to ascertain what the situation within the North itself looked like. In this respect, Darfur presents a better case because of its sociological configurations that encompasses a large number of Arabs of different tribes.[1] After Darfur was annexed it was, for more than three decades, a neglected outpost of empire. This is simply because the British neither have any concrete policy nor plan for the region but concerned more about its strategic position because the region was also targeted by the French who were in control of neighbouring Chad. As part of this neglect, like the South, a native administration was established with the local tribal chiefs that were empowered in order to maintain low number of British nationals in Darfur. The British administration started a transformation of the Sudanese tribal communities, altering the existing political systems and structures based on

[1] It is often argued that there are 27 different Arab tribes in Darfur.

flexible kingship, thereby creating the prevailing political reality of today. By the time the RoS gained its independence, the polarisation of the society along North/South divide, and other cleavages had completely deepened and gave rise to hierarchical classification patterned along tribal/ethnic lines which gave more worth to certain ethnic group over others, using various anthropological arguments that are based on racial prejudices to portray the virtues of the Arabs of the Nile valley vis-à-vis the vices of others. This polarisation has lifelong effects on the Sudan's socio-economic and political developments.

On the political front, politics became elite (Northerners and riverine) game and luxury to the South (African ethnic groups) reinforced by Islam and Arabism as its cultural vehicle. The political worldview of the northern elite became the "Sudanese", while Sudanese nationalism equaled Arab viewpoint. Thus, the term "Sudanese" equaled "riverine" and it was reinforced by such pejorative and value loaded terms such as *Awlad Al Balad* versus *Janubi* (Southerner), and *Gharbawi* (Westerner), and *Awlad Arab* versus *Abid* (Slaves), or *Nubawi* (Nuba) they serve to enhance the worth of some groups and denying the human worth of others. At the extreme, the riverine Arabs classified different ethnic groups into five main identity groups based on their perception in order to manipulate the political space. The main groups, according to Harir (1994: 37), are:

> "(a) The dominant group under the rubric of *Awlad Arab* (Northern riverine Sudanese including Nubians)[1],
> (b) Gharaba (or Fellata or Tarkana) which included all the groups that stemmed from the West, the boundary of which started beyond the White Nile;
> (c) Hadendowa which is shorthand for all groups belonging to the Beja conglomerate;
> (d) Nuba, and;

[1] The *Awlad Arab* included some groups of non-Arab Nubian extraction, like the Mahas, Dagla, Kunuz—See Harir, 1981.

(e) Janubiyyin which included all the southern groups irrespective of whether they were Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, or Sudanic."

Space will not permit detailed discussions here, but what is striking is that this hierarchical classification of the groups lumped together made it easy to accord the *Awlad Al Balad* (that are at the zenith of the ethnic pyramid) more worth than the other groups that are generally classified as *Zurga* (black) and *Abid*. These prejudices denied the Sudan the opportunity of having a united plural society as they determine the share of political power, economic resources that are favourable to the riverine Arabs.

This perception, rooted in the idiosyncrasies and psychological mindset of the riverine Arab elite, justified by anthropological arguments (real or manufactured) and propelled by the 'cultural core' of Arabism explains the lopsided development between Khartoum and the peripheral areas. While the Gezira triangle in the North became the bastion of development, the West, East, and South populations became on lookers and trailed behind in term of socio-economic developments. The marginalised ethnic/tribal groups served as followers of political parties under the leadership of the riverine Arabs. In this case, Darfur follows the narrow path that leads to a market where all the traded commodities are generally referred to as "underdevelopment."

5. Distributive Injustices and State-Led Undervelopment in Dafur

One more example of distributive injustice is shown in a study carried out by the economist Kabaj who conducted a comparative analysis of the three equally populated Sudanese states (Northern, Kassala, and Western Darfur). Kabaj's most serious finding was that the northern state received as much transfers as three times that of the Western Darfur state. He concluded cynically that "…the Khartoum Ministry of Finance is

the one responsible for the rebellion erupting in Darfur region in western Sudan" (Mohamed, 2007)[1].

Aside from the 'unequal' relations between Darfur and Khartoum and, the way in which Darfur was incorporated into the evolving Sudanese state that serve as the historical foundation in the marginalisation of the region, Kabaj's research results apparently unmask the modern form of patron—client relations that characterised Khartoum—Darfur ties, a feature of a neopatrimonial political system. Without question, the marginalisation of the region continued unabated after Sudan's independence, thereby furthering the dominant position of the riverine Arabs using the Sudan's Ministry of Finance as a tool of economic repression of the peripheries. The Sudan is underdeveloped; a disheartening situation that makes its constituent poor regions to depend heavily on Khartoum for development projects, thereby confirming Mc Laughlin's (1962) assertion that in the Sudan "the government is the main developer through its direct activities". In this case, Darfur presents a 'special scenario' its level of underdevelopment surpasses those of others and has highly impoverished 'almost all' social categories in the region. Darfur's economy is dominated by subsistence agriculture (i.e. traditional farming and traditional livestock raising), which left alone is insufficient for better standard of living of Darfurians, not to talk of developing the region. The 'relative' underdevelopment in this region compared with other regions makes Khartoum the main developer of Darfur with far reaching socio-political implications for both the region and the wider Sudanese state. This is because "real or imagined uneven regional development by the Government in Khartoum is chiefly responsible for the emergence of regional political movements, who demanded an equitable share of the national wealth and power (Mohamed, 2007).

Furthermore, in my analysis of contemporary Darfur's marginalisation, I rely on the works of Mohamed[2] and other

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[1]See the interview with Kabaj in *Sahafa Daily*, 10 February 2005.

scholars. [1] The International Labour Office (ILO) Report concludes that the overall economy of the Sudan is agricultural [2] and characterised by dualism. The dual agricultural system is such that the Southern, Kordofan, and Darfur regions were home to the traditional agricultural system with no employment of machinery. On the other hand, the modern agricultural sector and economic development and service projects were concentrated in the Northern region. This development sidelined Darfur and the other two regions from reaping the fruits of growth. Furthermore, the marginalisation is also revealed by the Household Income Data of the Sudan Department of Statistics of 1973. The data shows the annual family income in the former six Sudanese regions—Khartoum, Northern, Central, Eastern, Kordofan, and Darfur—in the years 1967/1968 and 1982/1983. During the first surveyed period, Darfur region income was the lowest while during the 1982/1983 measured year, Darfurians' pauperisation skyrocketed with Khartoum annual family income tripled that of Darfur's.

Distributive injustice and marginalisation of Darfur become forward ever when one peep deeply into the Sudanese government spending/expenditures which Mohamed perfectly analysed to unveil the roles of Khartoum in entrenching "regions' relative development disparity". Two periods (1971—1980 and 1998—2002) were chosen based on the availability of data and these periods are pivotal in Sudan's socio-economic and political life. To start with, the first period coincided with the Arab—Israeli war that enabled the oil-producing countries in the Middle East to become super rich which, by extension, saw Arab petrol-dollars find

[2]Mohamed utilised the International Labour Office (ILO) Report of 1976 and Household Sample Survey of the Sudan Department of Statistics of 1973. The data in the Household Sample Survey are projection not actual counting. My reliance on these works does not imply that I take side with these scholars; rather it is based on their objective analyses. For example both the ILO Report and the Household Income Data of the Sudanse Department of Statistics were consulted and scrutinised and Mohamed's analysis was found highly impartial.

[1]Other works consulted include Hamad, M. Z. Mohamed (n.d).

[2] On Sudan's agriculture, see generally: Haland, 1991; various chapters written by Elbadawi, Manger, Ladislav, Mohamed Salih, in Mohamed Salih (ed.), 1987.

its ways into the Sudan's treasury from friendly Arab countries. This, in turn, empowered the RoS to embark on development projects. The second period, 1998—2002, saw Sudan's as oil producing country which translates into more economic power. The two periods, altogether, were era of economic buoyancy that saw the GoS in active development projects and spending spree. But the question that is pertinent and needs scholarly attention is: how just and even are the developmental activities in the Sudan? In answering this question, Mohamed utilises three indicators of government spending to show regional differentials with distributive injustice: per capita regional share of central expenditure in the regions; regional share of central expenditure compared to regional population; and regional index of advantage and disadvantage, calculated as: regional share minus average share, divided by the average share:

$$\frac{\text{Regional share [minus] Average share}}{\text{Average share}}$$

Thus, I will like Professor Mohamed to speak for himself here:

> By using these three measures, it is possible to calculate the ratios of advantage for all regions. Those regions with a minus sign had less than their due share. The data revealed that the Central region was most advantaged with (+0.949), followed by the North (+0.652), Khartoum (+0.473), and the East (+0.220). Darfur belongs to the minus category with (-1.064), along with Kordofan (-1.309). Darfur and Kordofan were therefore considered less developed than the other regions, during the period (1971—1980). For the second period (1998—2002), the ratio of advantage for the Northern region (+1.036) was the highest, followed by that of Kordofan (+0.317), the Eastern region (+0.018), the Central region (-0.162), Darfur (-0.521) and Khartoum (-0.7).

The statistics above offer the opportunity for comparing the two periods in term of advantages and disadvantages to the

regions' development. It becomes apparent that both the Eastern and Northern regions were favoured in 1971-1980 and 1998-2002. Kordofan region, despite the fact that it was unfavoured in the first measured period, became well off during the second period. Contrastingly, the Central region and Khartoum had advantages in the first period, but were disappointed in the second period. Darfur, unfortunately, suffered during the two measured periods. What this implies is that regional share of the federal purse is highly asymmetrical with Darfur region, the greatest casualty of the entrenched inequity in the highly neopatrimonial system and defective federation baptized, the Sudan.

At another level, the injustice against Darfur was also revealed by a group known as "The Seekers of Truth and Justice" that issued a book titled "The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan" in May 2000[1]. The book chronicles the socio-economic and political imbalances between the Sudan's Arab population and the black Africans. According to the Black Book, three Arab ethnic groups—the Shaigia, Jaaliyyin, and Dangagla (representing only 5% of the entire Sudan's population)-dominate the country's socio-political and economic life. Since 1956, the three favoured Arab ethnic groups have occupied between 47% and 70% of ministerial positions and the presidency. Furthermore, the book unveils the political marginalisation of the peripheries, including Darfur and south Sudan. Although, it can be argued that there is appreciable improvement in the latter's share of the country's patrimony due to its (South) armed struggles by the Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) championing the cause of the Southerners, compared with the area like the West (Darfur inclusive). This is still meager when compared with the North's. For instance, by 1999, the Book reveals that the ministerial-level appointments of the South was 16.4%, while the share of the West, East, and Central regions were 0%, 1.4%, and 2% respectively. This was measly compared with the Northern region's 79.5%.

On the economic flank, it is not surprising to discover that Kabbaj's findings find solace in the convictions of the

[1] The Black book is available at: http//www.sudanjem.com

authors of Black Book where the Sudanese Ministry of Finance was accused of acting as an agent of, and front for, northern acquisitiveness. The Book argues that "only 5% of its (Ministry of Finance) staff comes from outside of the northern region. Hiring of staff in the Ministry is primarily reserved for northerners. People from other regions have to contend with the demeaning jobs of tea-making and cleaning offices and toilettes…" (See also Wallis, 2004) This contention reveals the neopatrimonial character/vulnerable political system of the Sudan, where the strong leader stands at the top of the power pyramid and personalised the public sphere with the help of his cronies in patron-client relations, draining the national treasury, mismanaging state resources to the satisfaction a few at the perils of the larger Sudan.

6 The Consequences of Prising Darfurians Out of Development

The marginalisation of Darfur has impacted negatively on every facet of the region's life. Poverty, unemployment, banditry, etc are now its features. The underdevelopment, coupled with ecological deterioration and famine have flared up Darfur—Khartoum tension, intra-tribal/inter-ethnic conflicts, and conflicts between African farmers and Arab pastoralists. As said earlier, the ecological deterioration in the region made the biting effects of marginalisation felt by the various identity groups thereby providing a fertile ground for ethnic conflicts that reached their zenith in the mid-1980s. The drought that consumed the northern part of Darfur in the mid-1980s became unbearable as the economic activities became grounded. By early 1985, the drought had completely forced more than 10 million Africans to abandon their homelands in the desperate search for food and water. During this period, livestock perished in their thousands. Also during this period, between 70% and 80% of the livestock were reared from northern to southern Darfur died, while between 40% and 50% of those reared in southern Darfur died consequent on lack of water and pasture (de Waal, 1989). This situation induced an

unprecedented movement of the pastoral Arabs and livestock into the central and southern Darfur occupied by such ethnic groups as, Fur, Birgid, Daju, etc. that are farmers who produce the staple crop *dukhun,* i.e. bulrush millet and also has age-old practice of *hakura* (i.e. land tenure systems) among themselves to the exclusive of strangers (non-members). This is a practice where the Sultan allocated land to the leaders of specified ethnic groups for the common use of the groups in question. Among the Fur, the practice is such that in each locality, the group leader/head allocated usufruct rights in land to the members of the diffusely ambilineal. Here, it is possible for strangers to be allocated such usufruct rights on the agreement that he will remit one-tenth of the produce at harvest. Many non-members had been allocated land on usufructuary terms, and were later incorporated in to the local system. But, the mass influx of the herders in Darfur in the second half of the 1980s became problematic due to the non availability of arable land to accommodate them and became a source of threats to the well established *hakura* system. Thus, tensions were completely mounted while animal thefts, cattle rustling, and inter-ethnic showdowns became frequent.

Additionally, African farming ethnic groups (the Fur and Birgid in particular) became very uncomfortable and hostile to camel-riding Arab nomads from north Darfur who increasingly trampled their farmland as they roamed in search of pasture. Thus, the Fur became very apprehensive and tried to avoid the migrants by excluding them from their highly valued lands, for in their view, if they were allowed, there sheer number will change ethnic balance and hence affect the well established customary rights of the host groups. This contrasted sharply with the age-old practice where under normal circumstance, the Fur traditionally welcomed their guests with open hands, shared their resources with them. The practice that had resulted in many migrants to finally settle and became part of the local system (Haland, 1969).

The massive migration of Arabs into the Fur areas was of a completely different character. For, the Arabs came to live permanently. To advance their interests, the Arabs "opted for a different concept relating to access to natural productive resources. They were to be seen as Sudanese

nationals who had inalienable and equal rights to all productive resources available." The conflict continued throughout this period because the regional government was paralysed under the destructive force of political ethnicity. This is because government officials were divided along ethnic lines where each group commenced supporting the position of one or the other of the protagonists. The more problematic of the situation can be put thus: "as the ruler was from the Fur, the other groups played precisely on that, convincing themselves that they were unjustly treated because it was a Fur led government. They acted towards the Fur accordingly and incidents of armed robbery were occurring in the farming belt of central Darfur" (Harir, 1994). This volatile situation and it accompanied charged political atmosphere forced the Regional Governor of Darfur to leave the region due to the lackadaisical attitudes of Khartoum.

With the lackadaisical attitudes of Khartoum and the partiality of the regional government[1], the conflict became brutal with devastating consequences for the region as a whole. Public utilities were razed. The protagonists knew well the positions of both Khartoum and regional government, thereby capitalising on them to get maximum supports from their respective backers to sustain their struggles. In the Fur/Arab conflict that became an all out war, the Fur engaged the services of militias (known as *Malishiat* in Arabic) while the Arabs did the same by using knights to massacre their Fur victims, burned down their villages, while their orchards were completely uprooted. Also, the Fur did not spare Arabs' pastures and livestock.

The Arabs/Fur conflict apparently exposes the potency of both ideology and ethnicity and, by extension, race as instruments of warfare because, the Arabs looked up to Tripoli for arms and supply, and as a source of ideological inspiration which translates into the extension of the so-called 'Arab belt' (*al hizam al Arabi*, Arabic*)* in Africa. In addition, the conflict took a religious dimension when it was

[1] The regional government completely lost its credibility due to its partiality in the conflict. Since it was a Fur dominated government, the Arabs in particular rejected the government force as being neutral.

being used as Jihad to liberate the Arab world. Consequently, the SPLM/A served as a role model for the ethnic Fur and also looked up to Hissne Habre's Chad and via this channel to the United States, Egypt, for arms. All these efforts were championed by their respective elite who took sides in the conflicts. The protagonists also aligned with major political parties at the national level as a strategy to further their cause within the central government to their own favour.

The preceding discussion portrays the situation in Darfur in the 1980s through the 1990s as the Fur and the Arabs were at loggerhead for the control of the available limited productive resources. As Khartoum—Darfur tension mounted over the perpetual impoverishment of the latter, Darfur own internal conflicts, apparently, made its underdevelopment seemingly irreversible, a situation that made the region politically, economically, militarily vulnerable.

7. Confronting the Issues: Darfurians' Responses

The confrontation between Khartoum and the Darfur region actually encouraged the emergence of regional identity movements that became instruments in the struggles against what is referred to as "internal colonisation" from the riverine Arabs. In the process, educated Darfurians became the vanguard of resistance to Khartoum domination and its 'imposed' riverine Arab-led regional government in Darfur. Another bone of contention was the domination of the regional economic activities (especially trade) by the Jellaba traders (Northerners) using the state as instrument of oppression; while regional administration continued repression of the dissenting opinions. Darfurians became sidelined in their attempt to enter either civil or military services, a situation that refreshed Darfurians' memories of the position of their beloved Sultanate that was independent prior Sudan's independence

The first response to marginalisation came in the form of the emergence of an underground group named, the 'Red Flame' (*al-Lahib al-Ahmar*, Arabic) that targeted the Jellaba traders. In spite of its efforts in raising the tempo of

resistance and created fears in the minds of the Northerners, the Red Flame did not last long. Its demise saw the emergence, in 1963, of another more powerful covert group named, Soony. This organisation, unlike its predecessor, became more aggressive in achieving its objectives. It also succeeded by being the rallying point for both Darfurians in the Armed Forces[1], and civilians, while its ethnic base was quite diverse since it presented itself as a fighter against the Jellaba for the benefit of Darfurians. Soony also could not achieve much since it fell under the firepower of Khartoum. One negative after effect of this episode was that it resulted in the mass purge of Darfurians in the National Army and multiple hurdles were created with the intent of reducing the chances of entry of Darfurians into the military and police academies (Harir, 1994: 156).

These humiliations of Darfurians lifted up their spirits; a determination that led to the creation of the Darfur Development Front (DDF) in 1964 as, not only an overt, but also a well organised organisation to champion the cause of the marginalised region in question. Though, other such organisations as the Beja Congress, the General Union of the Nuba Mountains, were established purposely to champion their respective ethnic cause, but DDF stands out for two main reasons. First, while other organisations were established on a very weak/narrow ethnic base, this was not the case of DDF that enjoyed supports from 'almost all' ethnic groups in the region which definitely enabled it to command a numerical superiority/advantage. Second, the core of DDF leadership were intellectuals who conceived the idea that though, the organisation was, *prima facie*, established to champion Dafur's interest, but saw nothing wrong in active participation in politics at the national level. Thus, Darfurian theoreticians went ahead and praticalised this idea under Ahmed Draige's Chairmanship by aligning the organisation with Ummah political party tactically to furthering the region's interests by exploiting the national

[1] During this period, Darfurians were the majority in the Sudanese Armed Forces, but they formed the bulk of the rank and file.

platform already provided by the party that enjoyed the supports of the Ansar brotherhood in the West. The principal casualty of this political strategy and permutation was DDF itself since the organisation was, with time, consumed by the Ummah party. This is because rather than realising its original dream of championing regional interests and identity, Draige became the leader of the Ummah parliamentary opposition in 1968.

This was the situation in Darfur when the country suffered a major political catastrophe occasioned by the coup d'etat of May 1969 in which Colonel (later Field Marshall) Gafar El-Nimeiri was installed as the military head of the RoS (Badmus, 2008; Johnson, 1991). The coup had significant consequences on Darfur for two mutually reinforcing reasons. First, the regime strove hard to weaken the potency of political ethnicity, tribalism, etc, by proscribing all political parties, ethnic/tribal and regional organisations, including DDF, purposely to promote national unity and its 'melting pot' philosophy, while the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) became the sole and legitimate party. Thus, the agitations of Darfurians came to the backburner. This saw the exodus of dissatisfied Darfurians in exile, while those in the SSU continued their struggles clandestinely. Second, the effects of the military regime became a double edge sword, for the El-Nimeiri government extended the famous Regional Autonomy Act, agreed during the 1972 Addis Ababa Accord that ended the first Sudanese civil war where regional autonomy was granted Southern Sudan, to cover the whole country in 1980—a move that was welcome by all Darfurians. At another level, it is easy to learn that the joyous mood/euphoria of the people was short-lived simply because the Governor that was appointed by the central state was a non-Dafurian. Twelve months later, this situation saw the region, once again, erupted like a sleeping volcano. The intensity of the upheaval beat the imagination of Khartoum which made the central state to succumb to pressure and appointed Ahmed Draige, a Darfurian of Fur ethnic background, as the Governor of Darfur. Hence, Darfurians were relieved when the 'internal colonisation' ended.

Thus, internal political discensus among political elite, ethnic bigotry, political bickering, conflicts induced by

ecological deterioration occasioned by severe drought of the mid-1980s, coupled with the claims and counter-claims of ethnic/tribal hegemony among the Arabs and ethnic Fur (Blacks) made Darfur the zone of death that eventually weakened and virtually grounded Draige's government. Though, attempts were made by the region's intellectuals to surmount this problem by the formation of the National Council for the Salvation of Darfur (NCSD), a non-political organisation that did its best to resolve Darfur's internal problems. But, it becomes unfortunate that just like the DDF, NCSD went into oblivion when it was banned by the Revolution of National Salvation (RNS) that staged a successful coup on 30 June 1989.

8. The Post-Naivasha Sudan and the Tragic Situation in Darfur

> The 2003 rebellion grew out of frustration in Darfur at exclusion from state structures of power and wealth (ICG, 2007: 1)

It is not difficult to accept the fact that Darfur was highly unstable throughout the 1980s. The instability was also compounded by its geographical misfortune since it shares borders with Chad and Libya; two countries that were foes during this period, and the internal political crisis in Chad (between Hissen Habre and Goukhouni Weddeye). In the 1980s, the Libyan strong man, Colonel Gaddafi intended to shift the 'Arab belt' (*al hizam al-arabi*, Arabic) downward into Sahelian Africa-'the African belt' in which the main target was Chad and to annex the Aouzou strip in the north of the oil-rich Chad. Between 1987 and 1989, Libyan money, arms and ammunitions, with the assistance of the Sadiq El-Mahdi's leadership of the Sudan, found their destinations among the Chadian armed rebels that opposed N'Djamena. In this context, Darfur became the stage post of the Chadian rebels and the various dissatisfied sahelian Arabs and Touaregs that were formed into an Islamic Legions (*al-failag al-Islami*—Arabic) to fight proxy war in Chad. Sadly, arms

became proliferated in Darfur with negative consequences on the security situations as it compounded and intensified Arab/Fur festering conflicts. The insecurity of the region continued unabated in the 1990s with Chad, Libya, and other interests competing for supremacy and hegemony in the region with the assistance of various ethnic groups.

The present Darfurian crisis is rooted in the signing of the Naivasha Peace Protocols between the GoS and the SPLM/A on 26 May 2004[1]. The agreement recognised the protagonists (GoS and the SPLM/A), while other actors and regions were regarded as irrelevant, their interests and grievances not addressed, and other conflicts, either in the North or South were completely overlooked. Thus, Darfurians became apprehensive of the unfolding developments and weaknesses of the Naivasha's, took up arms against Khartoum to halt the age-old marginalisation. A secular and aggressive group named Darfur Liberation front (DLF), later renamed SLM/A mounted series of armed attacks on government positions in Darfur and vowed to continue fighting until Khartoum acceded to its demands. The SLM/A believed that their actions would definitely attract world's attention and correct the 'erroneous' impression that the peace deal with the SPLM/A is sufficient to resolve Sudan's multiple ethnic, socio-economic and militaro-political crises. In a quick succession, another moderately Islamist group known as JEM took up arms against Khartoum.

The two insurgent groups started attacking the Sudanese government forces' positions in earnest. Although, Khartoum had earlier dismissed the Darfurian insurgents as mere bandits, and clearly one of the common Darfur's perennial problems, but the military feat of the rebels discredited Khartoum's claims and became a source of embarrassment with rebels attacking El-Fasher airport and destroying half a dozen military aircraft. Facing the reality of the deteriorating security situations in Darfur and impending anarchy, and threat to its own hegemony, Khartoum opted for courting the assistance of militias, drawn majorly from the nomadic peoples of Darfur that had

[1] The Naivasha Protocols (in Kenya) led to the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the second Sudan's war.

been at daggers-drawn position with their Darfurian sedentary farmers and pastoralists counterpart for years, to fight with scorched-earth tactics. These militias were formed from diverse backgrounds: there were a group of northern 'Arab' camel nomads, known as the *Ben Helba*, and the mercenary former Libyan Islamic Legionnaires. The two groups merged to form what is now known as *Janjaweed* which Khartoum supports with arms and virtually unlimited freedom to do what they like. The *Janjaweed* militias were unleashed on local peasants and general civilian population. The involvement of countries like Chad, Eritrea, and China through their financial and/or military supports to one Darfurian group or the other has added international flavour to the conflict with serious tension along Sudan-Chad border. With Darfur's current tragic situation and the sufferings of the innocent civilians, especially the vulnerable categories, what then can be done to save this Africa's eye sore?

9. Conclusion and the Way Forward

Rescuing the situation and returning to normalcy is very simple and simultaneously complex. It is simple in the sense that we need to recognise the fact that the proximate causes of the conflict can be located at the domestic environment, but the situation becomes more complex with the involvement of external actors and interests especially the neighouring countries, China, some Arab countries, etc. Then the search for sustainable peace in the region has to begin from Darfur itself. In this context, the age-old and well-recognised traditional Darfur conflict reconciliation mechanisms will definitely resolve the intra-tribal conflicts but with a caveat. This has to be done with the concurrent socio-economic development of the region from the federal purse. And at the same time, Khartoum needs to jettison its lopsided policies in favour of the one that is inclusive of all ethnic nationalities in the country. I raised this caveat because such traditional conflict reconciliation mechanisms have been part and parcel of resolving Darfur conflicts but

have not achieved the goal of having a sustainable peace in the region. For, the underdevelopment that pervades Darfur where the competitions for limited productive resources are severe. Economic development of the region through irrigation, infrastructure development, etc will go a long way in resolving the conflicts permanently. The Second aspect of the problem centers on the central state itself. Apparently, political and economic powers in the Sudan have been dominated by the so-called *Awlad al Balad.* This should not be so. Sudan needs a genuine federal system with equal representations of all interests which should translate into equitable distribution of the country's resources and wealth. This will definitely enhance and encourage the sense of belonging among Darfurians.

The complex aspect of resolving the festering conflict is how to stop the internationalisation of this internal conflict. That is how to insulate the conflict from external interference. The first task is for the international community to let both Libya and Chad realise the havoc their actions are causing in this region and as a deterrence measure sanction the recalcitrant state and any country supporting the belligerents as well as increasing financial assistance to accelerate economic development of Darfur in particular, and Sudan in general purposely to reverse the country's seemingly irreversible decay. It is in this context that the African Union (AU)—United Nations (UN) peace mission in the country will meaningfully address this worst Darfurian challenge. Hence, the Sudanese state will definitely mirror Mazuri's (1985) assertion that:

> Islam and Westernism have been part of Africa's response to the imperative of looking outward to the wider world. But Africa's own ancestors are waiting to ensure that Africa also remembers to look inward to its own past. *Before a seed germinated, it must first decay. A mango tree grows out of a decaying seed. A new Africa*[1] *may be germinating in the decay of the present one—and the ancestors are presiding over the process* (Italics, added).

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